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In the Supreme Court
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STATE~1ENT

OF FAC-TS

Plaintiff is an employee of Clarence W. Silver Company. Clarence W. Silver Company, as an independent
contractor, on Dece1nber 28, 1948, was doing work under
contract for the defendant company in· the repair of a
transformer. Plaintiff sued defendant for defendant's
claimed negligence. The jury awarded plaintiff a judgInent of $5,000.00 for special and general damages suf3
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fered as a result of an injury to the right hand of plaintiff, \vhich injury occurred when a link in a chain block
separated, dropping the load being· lowered by the chain
block.
The facts of the case are as follo-w's : In 1937 the
defendant corporation purchased and placed in operation
a transfor1ner, the core of which weighed six tons and
was encased in a meta:l tank approximately twelve feet
high, three fee~ in width and four and one-half feet in
length. Clarence W. Silver, an electrical contractor, did
the work of installing and placing the transfor1ner in
operation. At the time the transfor1ner was purchased
Clarence -,,~. Silver reco1nmended and subsequently directed the installation of a large I bearn over the roof
of the building encasing the transforrner to be used as
the support on which the chain block could be put for the
purpose of raising and lowering the transforrner core
when repairs were needed. At the sa1ne tirne Clarence
Silver directed the defendant eornpany to purchase a sixton chain block. (R. 121-122)
In 1937 the chain block "\\~as purchased new, and Silver was called to check the chain block by the manager
of the defendant company. Silver inspected the chain
block in the pattern shop, it having been just taken from
the shipping package, and was "all kind of tied around
so as to make a close package in shipping." (R. 132) At
that time the chain black had its rated capacity strunped
upon at as "six tons", and conformed to the specifications
given by Silver. (R. 128) Silver then directed the boxing
4
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of the chain block, and placed tlte chain block in the box
in the trru1sformer roon1. (R. 122-123)
In the first part of Dece1nber, 1948, the transformer
failed and Clarence SilYer 'vas called in to handle the
repair. The core 'vas taken fron1 the tank by a crane,
repaired and placed back in the tank and placed in operation.
Within a few days the transfor1ner again failed and
the crane "~as called in and the core removed. ·At that
tune it becan1e evident tl1at the repairs would cover a
considerable period, and Silver directed that they use the
chain bloc.k. (R." 140) . A.t this tilne S-ilver knew that the
chain b'lock 'vas being used for the first time since its
purchase. (R·. 140) The chain block was placed in position under the direction of Silver and the hand chain
operated in accordance "\viththe usual test made by Silver
to see that the chain block "'"as in functiortable condition.
The core was lo"Tered by the crane on to the floor of the
transfor1ner building, and· on th~ second day of the breakdown the chain block was used to raise the core and lowe-r
it back into a pan 'vhich had been prepared for that
purpose. (R. 147) The core "\Yas then divided and the
upper section, "~eighing approxin1ately two tons, was
raised up through the roof and held while repairs were
1nade on the lo\ver part of the transformer. (R. 148)
Upon the core being repaired and assembled, the chain
block was used to rai~e the entire six-ton weight of the
eore and hold it susp·ended whi!le tests and infra-red
treahnent 'vere given to it. (R. 150)
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Approxirnately two weeks subsequent to the last
brea:Kdown the transformer had been repaired and_ action
was proceeding by way of placing the transformer in the
tank. The core had been raised with the chain block so
that the botton1 of the core was a pproxin1ately fourteen
feet above the floor of the transfor1ner bUilding.
The tank had been wheeled into position under the
core and the core was being lo,vered into the tank. Four
1nen ·were placed by Silver at each of the corners of the
tank and 'vere guiding the core into the tank. When the
core had been lowered to a point 'vhere the botto1n of the
core had reached a point three feet below the top of the
tank, a link in the chain block separated and dropped the
core, and the right hand of plaintiff was struck by the
2 by 4's placed to aid in the assembling of the unit.
(R. 155)
Plaintiff was taken to a doctor, where he receiYed
1nedical care. He lost approxin1ately six weeks' work
because of the injury. He sub1nitted his clain1 to the
Industrial Co1n1nission and was a\\-arded co1npensation
in the an1ount of $1607.35. Son1etime subsequent to that
award this action was co1nmenced.
There was no question of negligence involved in the
operation of the chain block; in fact, SilYer testified:

"Q. It came down just as evenly as you could
possibly want it, isn't that correct 1
"~\_.

Well, the one thing that we 'vere happy
about in lo,vering it on this w·as that \YhPn 've had
lo,vered it previously 'vith ~Ietto1ne, "~ith his hoist

6
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he 'vould drop it about three inches at a thne and
the one purpose of putting this up 'vas so we
could let it do'vn easy and slow.

.. Q. And that 'vas "~hat was happening; it
'vas coining down easyt
"A. ,~ery, very easy. We were just letting
it dow·n an inch at a tin1e.
"Q. ...\.nd there 'vas no jerking of the chain
by those lo"'"ering the hoist 1
"A. No.

'•Q. They handled it properly in eveTy way,
in the 1naneuvering of the hand chain and lo,vering itt
"A. Yes.
"Q. And "-hen this core dropped was there
any previous \Varning of any kind.
" ...:\.. No 'varning at all. It was a matter of
split seconds. There \vas a big noise and that was
the end of it." (R. 155)
The chain block was n1anufactured by the McColloum
IIoist and Chain Co1npany, a natiqnally advertised colnpany whose products are kno,vn under the trade-name
as indicated; it being a product known in the same sense
in the industry as Yale & To"'~ne, Reading and Chisholn1.
(R. 301, 302, 350, 351) A destructive tesfwas made on
the separated link, disclosing that the link had not been
annea~led, and apparently it \Vas the only link in the chain
block which had not received that treatment. (R. 175)
"\Vhether a link has been anneale:d or not can be deterInined only by a destructive test. (R. 175-178) This test
.7
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consists of cutting the link into sections, treating the
exposed surfaces and subjecting the surfaces to microscopic exainination.
The evidence of the experts is uncontroverted on
the use of chains and customs in industry to the effect
that the rating, ca1)acity and performance· of an assembled Inachine such as a chain block is accepted in. industry, and tests for performance, capacity and inspection
for satisfactory lnanufacture are not made before placing
the 1nachine in operation. Plaintiff's evidenc-e was, and
plaintiff's own experts testified without exce·ption, that
no test \\"as ever 1nade before the use of a chain block
'vith manufacturer's rated capacity, and plaintiff's expert~ further testified that it 'vas the practice to and in
t very instance they did rely upon the manufacturer's
rated capacity.
1

An1ong plaintiff's witnesses were Clarence W. Silver,
''who grewr up "~ith chain blocks" (R. 129); Niels Christensen, 1netallurgist for Co1nbined 1fetals Reduction
Co1npany (R.. 198), 'rho stated, "Well, if the con1pany
is ~ reliable con1pany you can accept the safe working
load as the rated load." At Page 206 of the record,
Christensen states that he had never been called upon
to make a test of a chain block for his con1pany, though
the testing "\Vas the duty assigned to him by that conlpany, and further states that it is the practiee and custom
for the industry and for his comp·any to rely upon the
rating of the 1nanufacturer, and that no test is made to
check the perfor1nance or capacity; further, that the
8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reason thi8 i~ not done is becauHe the 1nanufncture of
the entire unit of the bloek and chain provides the source
\Vhere all Ya.rious test~ neeording to the National s.afety
Couneil are 1nade for perforn1ance and specifications.
(R. 207)
Further support of this custon1 appears in the testiInony of Harry L. Young of the Harry L. Young Rigging
& Trucking Con1pany, and Fred Richeda of The Lang
Con1pany, \\-ho testified that the 1nanufacturer's rating of
eapacity and perfor1nance of an asse1nbled n1achine such
as a block and chain is accepted in the industry, and
tests of perfor1nance are not made before placing the
1nachine in operation. (R. 178, 311) The only testing
these experts eould suggest to determine defects, partieularly the latent defect in the link involved, would be
a destructiYe test resulting in a complete loss of the nlachinery. (R. 178, 311)
1

The negligence specified by plaintiff appears at
page 25 of the transcript, in Paragraph 6 of the An1ended
Complaint, as follows:
1. Inadequate, defective and negligent construction
of the link by defendant or defendant's agent from whon1
the block chain was obtained.

2. Defendant's negligence in supplying a defective
and inadequate chain block.

3. Failure to inspect and test the chain for tensile
~trength.

9
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4. If a test was made, the_ test was inadequate and
negligent.

5. If an adequate test was n1ade, defendant knew
of the defect and negligently and wantonly failed to
notify plaintiff of. the peril.

As to the performance and reliance to be placed by
reason o.f perforntance on a block and chain, Fred Richeda of The Lang Company, and trained expert of n1any
years' experience, states at Page 311 of the record:
"Well, after the load has once been taken on
the chain block there is absolutely no reason to
inspect the chain block, esp~cially if it is held
overnight or t\vo weeks, the chaiq block has definitely proved itself by taking the load and holding."
As indicated above, the chain block on several occasions had sustained and held the entire six-ton weight
of the transfor1ner core without evidencing or revealing
any defect. As· heretofore pointed out, the chain had
operated perfectly over the t\vo-\veeks' period of its use
and to the instant that the link failed.

STATE~IENT

OF POINTS RELIED uPON
POINT NO. I.

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE
THERE WAS NO DUTY ON THE DEFENDANT TO
MAKE AN INSPECTION OF THIS CHAIN BLOCK
AT ANY TIME.

10
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The chain block having been p·urchased [1·o1n a
reputable ·nH?nufacturer, it is preszuned that it ulas· Jnanufacfured, asse1nbled, inspected and tested by experts
be{o1·e it 1.vas ever placed upon the 1narket.
(a)

There is n-o standard of ca1·e in the evidence
show·ing the necessity of i1tspection or testi.ng before a
chain block is placed in use 1vhen it is purchased new
front the 1na-nufactu-rer.
(b)

There is no standard or evidence of a.ny necessity, practice or custo·m for an inspection of a c_ha.in block
following a period of and type of use as in this case.
(c)

POINT NO. II.
ONE SUPPLYING.CHATTELS GRATUITOUSLY FOR
THE USE OF ANOTHER HAS NO DUTY TO DISCOVER LATENT DEFECTS.

POINT NO. III.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE IN
PURCHASING FROM THE MANUFACTURER THE
BLOCK AND CHAIN IN THIS CASE, AND THE
COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THEY
COULD CONSIDER TilE PERSON FROM WHOM
THE CHAIN BLOCK \VAS PURCHASED AS NEGLIGENT.

POINT NO. IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING CHRISTENSEN TO GIVE HIS OPINION AS TO WHETHER

11
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THE CHAIN BLOCK SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSPECTED AFTER IT HAD BEEN IN USE FOR A
PERIOD OF FORTY-EIGHT HOURS.

POINT NO. V.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 7 AND
9 AND 2, 3 AND 4.

POINT NO. VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
).lADE TO THE· COURT AT THE CONCLUSION OF
PLAINTIFF'S CASE.

POINT NO. VII.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS
NOS. 4 AND 5.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I.
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE
THERE WAS NO DUTY ON THE DEFENDANT TO
MAKE AN INSPECTION OF THIS CHAIN BLOCK
AT ANY TIME.

The chain block having been purchased from a
reputable Jnanufacturer, it is presunted that it was ·ntnnufachtred, asse1nbled, inspected -:and tested by experts
before it was et·er placed upon the 1narket.
(a)

12
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The e~sential theory of liability upon \vhieh
plaintiff originally predieated this aetion i~ that defendant o'ved a duty to 1na.ke an inspeetion and test of the
chain block prior to or at the titne it w·as tir~t used.
This theory appears both in the original co1nplain t (Paragraph 6, R. 2) and the atnended cou1plaint (Paragraph
6, R. 25-26). It affir1uatively appears, ho"Tever, front
plaintiff's evidence tha.t a1nong per~ons and in industries
using ne"· chain block~ there is a. practice and custoin
to rely upon the rated capacity of the 1nanufacturer. No
test is ever n1ade of a ne'v chain block 'vhen the Inanufacturer giYe~ it a rating. Tlris custom clearly appears
fron1 all the testnnony of- the "T.itnesses in· the action,
and there is no eYidence to the contrary. l\ir. Clarence
,V. Silver testified as plaintiff'~ witness he "'grew up with
chain blocks." (R. 129) The chain block in question in
this action 'va~ purchased under his general supervision
and direction. He sa'v it 'vhen it arrived at the defendant's place of business in 1937. At this time it had just
been re1noved from the shipping package. With reference to the condition of the chain block at the time of
its arrival and necessity for a test, ~Ir. Silver testified
as follows:

"'Q. You 'vere satisfied as to the chain by the
rating that it bore from the manufacturer1
"A. ~Iy experience 'vith chain blocks had
been that when they ntarked a chain block for six
ton or three ton you could carry without any
danger six ton or three ton and they always were
built with a safety factor in the chain block unit
itself.

13
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"Q. Now this exanuning as a co1nplete unit
fron1 the n1anufacturer, is it your custom, or is it
the recognized practice to rely upon the manufac.
turer's rating of that block~
"~1R.

SMOOT : I will object to that as being
inco1npetent, inunaterial and irrelevant, Your
Honor.

"TilE COURrr: The objection is overruled.
"A.

I would answer that in this way. That

when you buy a chain block 'vhich you consider i~
a good make block n1y experience-! don't know
\vhether it is a practice, I 'vould change the wording on you-it has been my experience over 1ny
lifetin1e that if you bought from a responsibl(·
ehain block hoist con1pany that if the chain block
\Vas 1narked six ton you could lift six ton and you
never needed to 'vorry about it.
"Q. There 'vas never need of any test. I .~et
n1e speak of your experience. There \vas never
any need of any test of any kind? You relied upon
\Vhat the factory told you. It was"~fR. S~IOOT:

I ,vnl object to that as being

inco1npetent, Your Honor, as to whether or not
he needed to rely on a test.

''THE COlTR'l,: The objection "Till be overruled.
"A. It has been my experience, or n1y practice to take for granted that the 1nanufacturer
would state on the block six ton and you could
lift six ton without any danger." (R. 32)
N eifs Christensen, a 1netallurgist of Co1nbined ~1etals

Reduction Con1pany, whose duties consisted of supervis14
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ing use of chains in ehain blocks in this cotupany states:
(R. 198) "\Veil, if the cornpany is a reliable company,
you can accept the safe "·orking load as the rated load."
He further states (R. 206) tl1at he had never been called
upon to Inake a test of a chain block for his company although testing 'vas the duty assigned to hiln, and that
the rea.son the test "~as not 1nade of all new chains was
that the practice and custon1 in the industry and for his
co1npany "'"'"as to rely upon the rating by the tnanufacturer. lie stated tl1at it is 'veil known in the industry
that the 1nanufacturer has the equipment and testing
devices, and n1akes the tests required pursuant to the
recommendations of the National Safety Council both as
to perfor1nance and specifications. (R. 207) To the same
effect it is the testimony of Harry L. Young, of the
Harry L. Young Rigging & Trucking Company, and
Fred Richeda, of the Lang Con1pany. (R. 178, 311)
As is pointed out hereafter in the brief, no question
was raised in the pleadings as to the fact that the chain
block was purchased from a reliable manufacturer. The
only test that could be 1nade \\-'"ould result in a destruction
of the chain itself. Certainly it would be unreasonable
to require a test of this kind. The fact that it was
purchased from a well known company implies that it
was assetnbled, inspected and tested by experts. The
rnanufacturer has all of the devices necessary to make
proper testings. The fact that it was ordere:d and received as a chain block with a six ton rated capacity justifies the be lief by defendant and its employers that its
1

15
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perfor1nance and specifications would be adequate to the
uses required of it.
(b) There is no standard of care in the. evidence
showing the necessity of inspection or testing before a
chain block is placed in use when it is purchased new
from the manufacturer.

In the case of Dunagan: v. Appalachian Power Co.,
33 Fed. ( 2d) 87 6, (4 CCA), a1nong the points raised in
that case was the ()bjection of counsel for plaintiff to
an instruction given by the Court for the reason that it
is claimed the instruction makes the custom of other
con1panies the test of due care. The Court said: "There
is another and even stronger reason ""rhy the instruction
complained of cannot be held reversible error, even if
we were to give it the construction for which plaintiff
contends. There was no evidence upon which to base
a contention that the exercise of due care in the 1natter
of inspection r~quired anything in addition of "That 'vas
shown to be custo1nary, and there was not even an allegation that the defendant "'as negligent in n1atter of inspection. It is true that the test of due care is not
custom or usage but what reasonable proof would require
under the circun1stances, but as said by ~T udge Knapp,
speaking for this Court in the caHe of /)outhern Railu~ay
Co. v. Miller, 267 Fed. 376 (4 C·CA):
"Evidence of custom is al"'ays competent and
often highly persuasive, and in the absence of any
evidence tending to sho"T that the custo1n follo,ved
by others in the business did not involYe reason16
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able care or of evidence upon 'vhich to base a
conclusion that reasonable proof would have suggested additional precaution, it should not be held
for reversible error that the Court adopted what
'va8 eusto1nary as the standard."
Continuing on "itl1 their discussion as to the custom
being the basis for care and a conclusive basis, the c·ourt
statest in the Dunagan case:
.. If there 'vas nothing upon which to base a
conclusion that reasonable proofs required anything 1nore than the customary inspection, plaintiff could not have been injured by an instruction
tha.t defendant 'vas required to make that which
was customary."

In the case of Lowden v. Hanson, 134 F·ed. (2d) 348,
the Court states:
"The equipn1ent having be·en purchased from
a reputable n1anufacturer, we are clear that the
defendants could not be charged with negligence , _
because of any structural or inherent defect which
was not patent at the time of its installation. Defendant~ were warranted in assuming in the absence of any notice to the contrary, that the equipInent was without structural defects, and it was
not incumbent upon them to dismantle the appliance and separate it into its various parts for the
purpose of discovering possible defects. It was
man,ufactured, as_sembled, inspected and tested by
experts before it was e.ver placed on the market.
This was implied frorn the fact that the manufacturer was a reputable one. While it was the duty
of defendants to inspect this appliance, it is our
view that in the absence of any evidence that it
'vas not properly functioning, defendants were not
I

1
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required to dismantle the appliance and sub-1n-it
it to a ttn'icroscopic in,spection ·or the other scientific 'tests suggestedr ·by one of the witnesses for
the purpose of discovering possible structural defects. The functioning of the S\\Titch did not indicate any defect or break, nor did it give notice or
warning of any deficiency. Under the undisputed
evidence we are of the view that there was no
negligence in failing to discover an alleged structural defect nor in failing to dismantle and subject
the instrumentality to a microscopic inspection,
there being no evidence of a custom of submitting
such appliances to such a test." .(emphasis supplied)

Further on in the opinion the Court states :
"In McGivern, v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 132
Fed. (2d) 213, we said: 'These instrmnentalities
we-re in general use and n1et with general approval
for the perfor1nance of this work. T'vo other
carriers doing switching in ~finnesota were shown
to follow exactly the same practice. While, custon1
or usage may not be controlling as fixing the
standard of care it 1nay be accepted "rhere the
custo1n or practice is not in itself negligent or in
disregard of the safety of the employee.' In
C'anadian Northern R. Co. v. Senske, supra, the
late Judge Walter H. Sanborn, speaking for this
court, a1nong other things said (201 F. 643): 'The
degree of care co1n1uonly exercised by other persons -engaged in the san1e kind of business under
similar circumstances presents such a standard.
* * * the best test of actionable negligence and
the true standard for the 1neasurement of ordinary care is the degree of care which persons of
ordinary intelligence and prudence, engaged in
the san1e kind of business, con1monly exercise
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under like circun1sta.nces. If the care exercised
in the case rises to or above that standard, there
is no actionable negligence.'"
In G-rand T·runk R. R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408,
36 L. Ed. 485, the Supre1ne Court of the United States
approved this charge :
"You fLx the standard for reasonable, prudent,
and cautious n1en under the circumstances of the
case as you find them, according to your judgment
and experience of what that class of men do under
these circun1stances, and then test the conduct
involved and try it by that standard."
In Canadian Northern R. Co. v. Senske, 201 Fed. 637,
t.he Court states:
"These authorities, and a 1nultitude more,
sustain the established rule that the standard of
ordinary or reasonable care is that degree of care
(1) which ordinarily prudent persons, (2) engaged
in the sa1ne kind of business, (3) usually exercise
under similar circumstances. It is plain that the
care which extraordinarily cautious or unusually
careless persons use would not be a correct standard. Nor would the care which prudent persons
engaged in other kinds of business would use
be the true standard. The care a farmer or merchant would dee1n proper, in the absence of evidence to guide him, and would use in running an
engine, or building a bridge, would be no criterion
of the ordinary care exercised by p-ersons clistolnarily engaged in those occupations. Nor would
the degree of care that prudent persons use or
would use under different circumstances furnish a
just crite_rion of ordinary care under the circumstances of a given case."
19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rrhe Court further states:
"In the absence of proof to- the contrary, the
. that each * * * comlegal presmnption always 1s
pany, its officers and ernployees, are faithfully
discharging this duty."

• * *
"When the degree of care which the railroad
cornpany actually exercised had been proved and
the queHtion arose \vhether or not this was ordinary or reasonable care, the legal presumption
still prevailed that other railroad con1panies, their
officers, and entplOiyees co1nmonly exercised ordinary care in making such inspections, and the
uneon tradicted evidence of their customary Inethod of 1uaking these inspections under like ~ircunl
~tance~ necessarily established, in the absence of
countervailing evidence, the true standard of ordinary care hy ,v·hich the inspection made by the
defendant n1ust be n1easured."

•

* *

''The validity of the general abstract rule
that the 1neasure of care required of any e1nployer
is that degree of care 'vhich an ordinarily prudent
u1an, engaged in the same kind of business, 'vould
have exercised under silnilar circumstances, is
conceded."

• • •

''In cases * * * in which there is no proof of
the degree of c.are "\\~hieh other ordinarily prudent
persons engaged in the sa1ne kind of business
commonly use, juries may measure the care required of a defendant by the application of this
rule to other facts and circumstances in evidence
before then1. But the best evidence of the degree
of care "rhich ordinarily pTudent persons would
have exercised under given circu1nstances is the
20
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degree of care "~hich ordinarily prudent persons
engaged in the san1e kind of business, custon1arily
have exercised and ron11nonly do exercise under
sin1ilar circmnstances. .A.nd, 'vhen the evidence of
this degree of care is substantial or undisputed, it
furnishes the true and the best standard of ordinary care by which that actually used should be
n1easured in all debatable cases.
''What the true standard of ordinary care is
in cases of this character is an exceedingly grave
and important practical question to all employers
and e1nployees. It is very important that this
standard should be as fixed, certain, and well
kno"\\11 as possible, so that eu1ployers can know before the events whether or not they are exercising
the requisite care and faithfully discharging their
duties. The degree of care commonly exercised
by other persons engaged in the same kind of
business under similar circumstances presents
such a standard. The opinions and verdicts of
juries, no two of which would probably agree, fixing the standard by which to measure the employers' care after the events have happened,
would necessarily be variant, uncertain, and speculative, and would furnish no reasonably certain
standard of measurement whatever.
"It is not denied that exceptional cases sometinles arise in which the degree of care exercised
is so clearly insufficient, or so plainly ample, that
the customary use of the same degree by others in
like circu1nstances becomes immaterial. But the
case at bar is not of that character. It is one of
the great rnultitude of cases in which the sufficiency of the degree of care exercised by the defendant was, in the absence of evidence, debatable., and
in 'vhich its sufficiency must b~ measured by the
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evidence in the case and rules of law applicable
thereto. In such cases the best test of actionable
negligence and the true standard for the IueasureInent of ordinary care is the degree of care which
persons of ordinary intelligence and prudence, engaged in the sa1ne kind of business, conunonly
exercise under like circumstances. If the care
exercised in the case rises to or above that standard, there is no actionable negligence. If it falls
below that standard, there is. * * *
"And where, as in this case, that degree of
care is established by uncontradicted evidence,
and the proof is C'lear that the care exercised bv
the defendant rose above it, it is error to permit
the jury to establish in their minds a higher
standard of ordinary care after the accident, a
:-;tandard unkno\vn, uncertain and speculative, and
to cast the defendant in da1nages because the care
it used did not reach that standard."
In Lake v. ~~henango F·urnace. Co., 160 Fed. 887, at
Page 895, the Court states :
•'There are cases in which the act or omission at issue· is in itself so clearly negligent that
the fact that other persons in th~ sa1ne or like
circun1stances have been guilty of it is insufficient
to modify its character or effect. * * * The defendant's act or omission 'vas not of that character;
and in such a case the true test of actionab]e
negligence is the degree of eare which persons of
ordinary intelligence and prudence comn1onl)~ exercise undeT the sa.1ne circu1nstances. If 1n .a
given eaf-!e thelcare exercised rises to or above that
standard, there is no actionable negligence; if it
falls below it there is. Hence, in an action for
22
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da1nages for negligence, evidence of the ordinary
practice and of the uniforn1 custom, if any, of
such persons in the performance under similar
circumstances of acts like those which are alleged
to have been negligently done is generally competent evidence, for it presents to the jury the
correct standard for their detern1ination of the
issue whether or not the defendant was guilty as
charged."
We submit in this case that there be no evidence of
any negligence or different standard in the custom or
practice of using blocks and chains, and there was no
need for any inspection of the new block and chain before
placing it in use on this occasion by the Clarence W.
Silver Company.
The original position of plaintiff was that the defect
in the chain was a latent one. The only test which would
reveal its existence would be to cut out a section of each
link and test it microscopically. The evidence produced
relative to this defect is contained in the testimony of
Don Rosenblatt and Christensen.
"A. Well, our examination, our microscopic
examination revealed that the particular link in
question had not had any normalizing -heat treatment, or annealed."
''A. The. two links that were adjacent to the
failed link showed that there had been an annealing treatment given to those particular links.
* * • We only tested those particular links."
"A. Well, the annealing treatment is supposed to relieve stress and give the steel in ques, tion the maximum ductility.'' (R. 176)
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"Q. An unnealed link would be 1nore brittle
than an annealed link'
"A. Yes, that is true." (R. 177)
"Q. Now, in order, Mr. Rosenblatt, to test,
and 1nake a test on every link in that chain to
detertnine whether or not it had been annealed
· 'vould you have had to go through this same process1

"A. Well, for every link you wanted to know
about you would have to polish it and look at it.

HQ. And that would Inean cutting out this
Hection so that you could polish it and get it under
the Inicroscope, is that correct 1

"A. Yes.
uQ. So you would have to destroy your entire chain to find out if each link had been annealed?
HA. That's correct. (R. 178)

"'Q. * * * could you look at this chain as it
appeared on the chain block itself * * * and by
looking at it tell 'vhether it had or had not been
annealedf

...A. No, I couldn't do that. (R. 180)
''Q. * * * Can you tell froin the two surfaces,
the rough surfaces on Exhibits 5 and 6, whether
the section you cut out would be a part of the
weld of that link?

"'A.

No, I coUldn't say 'vhether it is the weld

or not."

~'Q.

Are you able to 1nake any deterinina24
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tion yourself as to 'rhether ti1e break did or did
not occur in the 'veld~
.A.. Not fro1n just looking at it, no. If we
had all of the link. There are son1e pieces that
are n1i~sing no"~. The thing could be edged, microedged, and the 'veld area 'vould stand out as
a different color than the parent 1netal. That is
a test that could be 1nade if it 'vas ilnportant to
deter1nine 'vhether the fracture 'vas in the weld."
(R. 182.)
H

The follo,,ing is the
tensen:

te~titnony

of the 'vitness Chris-

"Q. Do ~"ou have an opinion as to whether
an unannealed link in the chain of the size and
description of defendant's Exhibits 4 and 5 there,
'\"hether such an unannealed link in such a chain
would constitute a latent defect in that chain?

'·A. Quite definitely I would say that an unannealed link 'vould be a 'veak link in the chain
and would be a menace to its safe use."

• • •
"THE COURT: I think you asked in reference to a latent defect. You claim something, I
guess, for the word 'latent' don't you'
"MR. S:WIOOT: Yes.

''THE COURT: I don't believe Mr. Christensen has answered in reference to that.
"Q. Now would an unannealed link, the fact
-let me put it this way-the fact that a link is
unannealed be observable by a meTe inspection'

"A.

That is very doubtful.
25
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"Q. And would there ever be an occasion,
or would there ever he a situation under which
you could observe and detect a link being unannealed merely by looking at it~
"A.

I doubt it veTy much.

"Q. Now, would a proof test of a chain be
likely to reveal the presence of an unannealed
link by breaking~
"A. A proof test would not reveal the unannealed link in a new chain, very probably." (R.
199)
"Q. Excuse me. Assuming a chain block
was new in the year 1937"MR. BURTON: Bought new.
"Q. Bought new and laid idly for a period
of eleven years and some months, would that have
had· any influence upon the steel in that~.
"A. There might be very rninor changes, but
I doubt if that would have much influence on it."
An important and striking fact in the case at bar
rs that this testimony with respect to the standard of
care, that is the accepted standard in the industry concerning whether an inspection was made of a new chain,
was the only criteria of reasonableness before the jury.
This testimony came fron1, a.nd was produced by plaintiff
and his witnesses. It was corroborated by the witnesses of
the defendant. There was nothing before the jury from
which any conclusion could be ma~e, except that reasonable men acting prudently in the industry, in which they
are expert and qualified and with regard to their own
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safety and the safety of the personnel 'vorking with
then1, did not 1ua.ke a test for any inspection of ne'v chain
blocks.

'rhe defendant Con1pany is not in the position of an
insurer. It is only bound to act and to exercise the care
of an ordinary 1nan. The rule is stated in Section 388
of tlze . Jnz. La·zo Institute Restatentent of the Law of
Torts, \:r ol. 2, p. 1039:
•'One "Tho supplies directly or through a third
person a chattel for another to use, is subject to
liability to those 'vho1u the f-.:upplier should exp·ect
to use the chattel, with the consent of the other,
or to be in the vicinity of its probable use, for
bodily ha.rn1 caused by the use of the chattel in
the 1nanner for "Thich, and by a pe.rson for whose
use it is supplied,- if the supplier
(a) kno"'Ts, or fron1 facts known to him should
realize, tha.t the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied;
(b) and has no reason to believe that those for
'vhose use the chattel is supplied will realize
its dangeorus condition; and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform
the1n of ib~ dangerous condition or of the facts
which 1nake it likely to be so."
·
Defendant is not subject to the liability prescribed
by this Rection. It did not fail to exercise reasonable
eare to inforn1 plaintiff of the dangerous condition of the
<~hain, or of facts ,v-hich 1nake it likely to be dangerous.
Tt <lid not kno'v or have any facts to indicate to it that
27
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the chattel was or was likely to be dangerous for the use
for which it was supplied. It did not have any reason
to believe that the plaintiff would not exercise the same
precautions that defendant would exercise acting for its
own safety in the use and exa1nination of the chain block.
Defendant owed no duty to 1nake an inspection of the
chain block, because it was not unreasonable for it,
exercising the prudence of a reasonable person, to rely
upon the manufacturer's rated capacity. The standard
of care required of defendant in the circumstances present in this case was the san1e standard which other suppliers and users of chain blocks had in similar circumstances. All of the evidence in the case was to the effect
that such persons, under such circu1nstances, do not make
an inspection -or test of chain blocks.
This is not a case where it can be said that defendant owed a higher degree of care than is usually exercised
by persons in the industry. The jury had before it only
one standard of care and only one criteria for the determination of whether defendant acted as a reasonable person. That criteria and th~t standard was, a.s hereinbefore stated, to the effect that tests of chain blocks, supplied by responsible manufacturers, are not made and
need not be made. The jury could only properly infer,
on the evidence before it, that defendant could not have
been negligent in failing to 1nake an examination or test
of the chain block in question.
The Court connnitted no less than two errors in its
instructions concerning the duty of the defendant in this
regard. In Instruction No. 4 the Court sta.ted:
28
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(R. -±1) '"You are instructed tl1at it was the
duty of the defendant in this case to use reason. able care to deter1nine and ascertain whether or
not the chain block in question was reasonably
safe for the plaintiff and other workmen to use
in the perfor1nance of the work in question.
'rherefore, you are instructed that if you find by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did not n1ake a reasonable inspection of the
chain at any time prior to the happening of the
accident, and that by such inspection the defect
could have been ascertained and discovered, and
if you further find that such failure.upon the part
of the defendant, if you find that they did fail to
u1ake ~uch inspection, was not such conduct as
'volild have been perforn1ed by a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances, and that the
failure of defendant to n1aker such an inspection
and the lack of discoYery of the defect, if any, in
the chain inunediately before the happening of the
accident, 'vas the proxin1ate cause of the breaking
of the chain and the resulting accident and injury
to the plaintiff, you 'vill then find the issues in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant."

In Instruction No. 5 the Court stated:
(R. 42) '~In detern1ining whether or not defendant acted as & reasonably prudent person,
under the circuu1stances involved in this case, you
may take into consideration the condition of the
chain block at the time it was purchased, the .cir~
cun1stances as to whom it was bought from, the
care and use it had received from the time it was
purchased and until the time of the accident in
question, its apparent mechanical and physical
condition when put into use by defendant's employees, the rated capacity and the weight of the
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transformer it was to be used to lift, the height
and duration of the lift that was to be made, and
the circumstances under which it was to be used,
and fron1 these Inatters and all the evidence in the
case, you are to determine whether or not the
defendant's conduct 'vas ·such as would or would
not be that of a reasonable prudent person, under
the circumstances."
The first error in these instructions is the implication that the jury could find from the evidence that defendant was obligated to 1nake an inspection; that is,
that there was before the jury a question as to whether
the standard of care was higher or greater than the conduct "chich defendant ad1nittedly was a party to in the
instant case. In other words, defendant did not make an
inspection of the chain block prior to the tilne of its first
use,- but neither did any other person under similar circuinstances. The instruction to the jury implied that
they could find that there was such a duty upon defendant. There was no evidence to support such an instruction. The Court obviously erred in this regar_d. No
standard of care to require such a test or exan1ination
was established.
(c) There is no standard or evidence of any necessity, practice or custom for an inspection of a chain block
following a period of and type of use as in this case.

As heretofore indicated, the . plaintiff changed his
theory of liability in this case in the llliddle of the trial.
In his pleadings (Paragraph 6 of the complaint and
amended con1plaint, R. 2, 25-26) he stated that there was
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a duty to n1a.ke an inspection and test of the chain block
prior to the fir~t use. A::; the trial progressed it becan1e
apparent that by reason of the standard of care estab""
lished in the industry itself, and the reliance on the manufacturer's rating capacity, no duty could be established
in this regard. Plaintiff "'"as unable to produce proof as
heretofore stated that a standard of care required inspection and tests prior to the first use, so he shifted to the
position that defendant owed to the plaintiff the duty to
inspect and test the chain during the period of its use.
It should be kept in n1ind that the chain block was used
on the second day of the breakdown to raise the core and
lower it back into a pan 'vhich had .been prepared for
that purpose. (R. 147) Then the upper sectio~ ·of the
core which 'vas approxirnately t".,.o tons in weight was
raised up through the roof and held while ·repairs were
being made on the lo-w·er part of the transformer. (R. 148)
The chain block "~as used to rai:-;e the entire six ton
weight of the core and held it suspended while tests and
infra-red treatn1ent 'vere given to the core. (R. 150)
This use had been for a period of several days prior to
the tilne ''lhen the link separated.
During all of the ti1ne plaintiff and other employees
of the Clarence VV. Silver Co1npany were using the chain
block with employees of the defendant company. Under
the circumstances plaintiff now asserts the claim that
defendant had an obligation to inspect the 'chain block
during its use.
Thi:s rhange of position "Tas asserted through the
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.testi1nony of the witness Christensen. The record show·s
at Page 219 that this witness 'vas excused, having conlpleted his original, direct and cross examination. The
court then proceeded to hear the testilnony of the plaintiff himself .. Before direct exa1nination of the plaintiff
was co1npleted the court recessed for the noon hour.
(R. 231). On the sa1ne day of the trial Judge \Tan Cott
called counsel for both sides into his office at 1:30 p~m.
The judge asked Mr. Smoot if plaintiff's case was completed as fa.r as introducing evidence of negligence was
concerned. Being assured that it was, the judge then
told the plaintiff's counsel that unless theTe was further
evidence to show an obligation by defendant to inspect
the chain block, a non-suit would be granted.
Thereupon the record shows (244) at the conlpletion of Reynold's testimony that ~ir. Smoot asked for a
five-minute recess to talk to the 'vitness Christensen
again, and at Page 245 nfr. Smoot 1nakes the staten1ent
that he V\7 ould like to ask leave of court to bring back
Mr. Christensen because of the further investigation and
inspection he had made of the evidence. These facts are
called to the court's attention to show the court what
occurred during the noon hour so that the court Inay
properly appraise the testirnony of ~1:r. Christensen and
to appraise the shift in position of plaintiff during the
trial .
.i_\_ t

Page 252 of the record Christensen presents the
follo,ving tef'tiinony:

"Q.

The testiluony concerning the difficulty
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and the probabilities 'vhieh you have just now
been called back to the stand about 'vas brought
up and discu~sed as you got back into the Court
here at 2:00 o'clock!

·• A. That's correct. Yes, tl1at is what I said.
"Q. And that was after your conversation
then 'vith Mr. Smoot and lVIr. Wilkinson 1

"A. No. I, they asked me to co~e back
and n1ake a further examination of the link, which
I did."
The purport of Mr. Christensen's testimony, after
being recalled to the stand, is to the effect that it was
probable a crack had developed in this particular link
prior to its ha,ing separated. When that occurred, Mr.
Christensen did not know (R. 249); in fact, his statement is this :
"Q. Now inas1nuch a~ you have some opinion on this can you tell me at which hour of the
forty-eight this started to separate?

"A. Not being God I wouldn't know, no.
"Q. * * * At which point, as this core was
being raised the last time, did it start to separate,
if you know~
"Q. I don't know.
"Q. You don't know that it separated during
the time that it was hanging there for forty-eight
hours1

"A. I merely said that it was highly probable, due to the nature of the material if it had
a crack it 'vould become evident a considerable
ti1ne before it broke."
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At Page 247 of the record the Court per1nitted Christensen to te~tify over defenda:nt's objection in the following respect :

"Q. In your opinion, should this have been
inspected after it had- been used for a. period of
forty-eight hours, holding a weight- of six tons 1
"A. Well, all I can say on that in view of
the type of machinery it would certainly have
been -the most wise precaution to examine it to
determine if there was any defect before the final
use."
. +.P.,...,\.......

Now, we ask the Court to contrast this testilnony
w~th the testhnony which was given by Christensen in
the 1norning on cross-exan1ination and at the conclusion
of his cross-exrunination on Page 209 of the record:

"Q. * * * assmning * * * a chain is bought
new and then it is placed in a box built for that
·purpose and it isn't used at all until on or about
the 16th day of December, 1948. It is used for
the fir:st tin1e and it is taken out of this box.
Now at that time the rated capacity, the six ton
load, is raised a~d lowered perhaps a foot or so
while they put a pan unde-r the core of the transformer. With that much use the-re is no reason
for any further check of the block .and chain at
that time1 I mean any test; to take it down and
1nake any further proof test after just raising and
lowering the rated capacity of the block a.nd
chain~

"A. Well if the rating, I 'vill say was correct, it ""'ould be natural to assume that the chain
\vould support the six ton load, but-

"Q.

Now34
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~' ~IR.

SniOOT : Let hhn finish.

··THE COlJRT: ,,~ell, I think perhaps he had
finished and the otl1er V."'"asn't responsive.
"Q. Mr. Christensen, after this block and
ehain 'vas engaged in raising and lowering a six
ton load there is no need to take the block down
and go out and·Inake some test of it ~t that time,
'vas there~
.. .L.\..

Under ordinary circumstances, no.

~~Q.

And in the p-rocess of repairing this
transfonner over a- period of two weeks when
perhaps a one-half ton load is moved in raising
the top part of the transformer off, then as the
lower part is repaired it is once again assembled,
say ten days later, then this same six ton load is
raised and held for forty hours while the ,
core is infra-red treated, there would be no ne;ed
for any further proof testing between the period.
of t'vo days and on the sa1ne job as an ordinary
practice1
"A. Not if you can accept the rating. That
· is the big question. If you can accept the rating
of it.
"Q.

Of the factory~

"A.

Of the Inanufacturer." (R. 211)

Fron1 the foregoing the "\vitness Christensen ha.s
definitely established the fact that there was no reason
for exrunining or testing the chain block after it had been
delivered to Silver or after it had been used up to the
tirne the link failed.
We

havt~

heretofore pointed out 1n Christensen's
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testimony that the crack n1ay have developed for the
first time on the last pull in raising the transfor1ner core,
and once again we would like to point out the testi1uony
on Page 249:
"Q. You don't know that ~t separated during
the time that it was hanging there for forty-eight
hours1
"A. I merely said that it was highly probable, due to the nature of the material."
It was on this testi:inony that Judge \Tan Cott reversed the position he had taken prior to the noon recess.
and it 'vas on this testitnony that he per1nitted the jury
to speculate as to whether a test and exa1nination should
have been 1nade before the lift 'vas 1nade for the last
time. The very mention of such a principle indicates the
absurdity of any such duty or obligation. Certainly
nothing is given in the evidence to support such a contention. A'll of the testitnony, including that of Christensen himself, is to the effect that no test or exainination need be made where a chain block is worked only
to the extent indicated in this case.
The evidence is clear that a chain block is accepted
at the manufacturer's rating and is never tested or examined other than was done· in ·this case to see that it is
operating properly. The evidence is clear that no reasonable examination would have revealed the defect in
the lack of annealing of the link. If the weld itself
was defective, that 'vould not appear until a crack had
developed. There is np evidence that even after com-
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panies have abused a block and chain, an examination
is n1ade of the 1nachinery or of the chain, link by link.
Is this Court to establish as a degree of negligence
in industry the failure to exa1nine a block and chain after
it has been used for forty-eight hours on a load w~thin
its rated capacity1 How could this Court establish such
a rule when there is no evidence that .industry itself has
ever required such an examination, or that such a use
could possibly drunage a chain or require inspection!
There was nothing about the use of the chain block that
was ilnprope-r or that the use exceeded a normal one o,f
equipn1ent of this kind. There 'vas no evidence whatever of any standard of care or any necessity of an
inspection of a chain block after it had been used only
five or six times for the very purpose for which it. was
constructed and supplied. There is not e-ven any evi~
denc.e to the effect that had any examination been made
any defect would have been apparent. We submit that
the court erred in permitting the jury to speculate that
son1e mythical requirement existed that defendant had
the duty to make such inspection. The most favorable
consideration that can be given to Mr. Christensen's testimony is that a "wise precaution" might be to make an
inspection of the kind he indicates. He does not know
of such a. standard in the industry. Such an inspection
might have disclosed a crack that might have developed
~ince the first use.
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POINT NO. II.
ONE SUPPLYING CHATTELS GRATUITOUSLY FOR
THE USE OF ANOTHER HAS NO DUTY TO DIS.COVER LATENrr DEFECTS.

· In Instruction No. 4 the trial judge instructed the
Jury:
"It was the duty of the defendant in this
case to use reasonable care to determine and
ascertain whether or not the chain block in question was reasonably safe for the plaintiff . . . .
to use in the performance of the 'vork in question."
Under the facts and circumstances in this case this
instruction was clearly erroneous and the giving of it
'vas reversible error.
There is no question in the evidence as to the fact
that the defendant offered the chain block for the use
of plaintiff and plaintiff's employer- as a gratuity and
not by reason of any contractual arrangement between
either defendant and plaintiff or defendant and plaintiff's
en1ployer.. Defendant permitted the chain block to be
used as a convenience, a favor, to the Silver Company.
In fact, it was Mr. Silver himself who made the decision
tha.t the chain block should be used rather than the hoist
'vhich had previously been used to lift the transformer.
The liability in such an instance is discussed in Section
392 o{ American Law Institute Restatement of the. Law
of Torts (1-lestatement on 1'orts, Volume 2, Pages 1064-

1068):
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·~one

'vho supplies to another, directly or
through a third person, a. chattel to be used for
the su.ppli.er's business purposes, is subject to
liability to those for whose use the chattel is
~upplied or to those 'vho1n he should expect to be
in the vicinity of it~ probable use for bodily har1n
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner
for "\Yhich and by persons for 'vhose use the· chattel is supplied:
(a) If the supplier has failed to exercise
reasonable care to 1nake the chattel safe for
the use for which it is supplied, or
(b) If the supplier's failure to give those
whom he should expect to use the chattel the
inforn1ation required by the rule stated in
Section 388 is due to his failure to exercise
reasonable care to discover its dangerous
character or condition."
The editors of the Restaten1ent specifically point out that
the words ''for the supplier's business purposes" do not
apply if the appliances supplied are furnished as a gratuity and not for the :--upplier's business purposes. (Ibid, •
p. 1068)

* * it is understood that the person who is
to do the work is to supply his own instrumentalities, but the person for whom the work is to
he done permits his o'vn tools or appliances· to beused as a favor to the person doing the work, the
tools and appliances are supplied as a gratuity
and not for use for the supplier's business purposes."
u

•

Illustration No. 3 on pages 1068 and 1069 applies
to tl1P fact~ and circun1stances in this case:
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"A, a building contractor, contracts to erect
a building for B, and erects the necessary scaffold. A en1ploys C, a sub-contractor to do the
masonry work. C in perfor1ning his 'vork as subcontractor uses the scaffold for the business purposes of A and C. The business having been completed according to the contract, B desires to have
so1ne additional work done on the exterior and
e1nploys C by an independent contract between
B and C. To do this work it is necessarv for the
use of the scaffold A says to C, 'He~e is the
scaffold; you may- as well use it.' C's use of the
scaffold in doing this additional work is not for
a business purpose of A."
In the case at bar, the Silver Company was employed
as an independent contractor to do the electrical repairing work required as indicated in the evidence. The
Silver Co1npany e1nployed ·a hoist operated by a truck
to lift the transfor1ner out of the 1netal container both
during the period of the initial repair and during the
first lifting of the lengthy remodeling and repair which
follo,ved. The decision to use the chain block was made
by ~ir. Silver. The chain block 'vas used as a gratuity as
far as the defendant \vas concerned, defendant not having obligated itself in any manner to furnish this kind of
equip1nent. According to the Restaten1ent's o'vn interpretation of Section 392, therefore, the ~pecial liability
there.in prescribed is inapplicable to the facts of this
case. 'Plaintiff 1nust rely upon the general liability of
the supplier of a chattel as elsewhere defined. (See Restatement 388 and Point I (b) of this brief.) In this
regard it has been heretofore pointed out that the liabil40
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ity described in Section 388 of the Restatement is absolutely inapplicable to the facts in this case because
defendant did not kno'v of any facts not in the possession
of the plaintiff 'vhich caused hlln to believe that the
chattel "'"as unsafe or dangerous for the intended use.
Plaintiff cannot bring hiluself under the ru1e stated in
Restate1nent Section 388 for the reason that the e:vidence clearly established the fact to be that any defect
in the chain could not be discovered except by a destruc,tive test. Such a test 'vould not be reasonable.
Instruction 3(a) (R. 40) is substantially a word
for "'"ord recital of the rule stated in Section 392. Since
it i~ inapplicable to the facts of this case, it is obviously
rni~leading and plainly reversible error. .
This argrunent is presented for consideration in the
event the Court disagrees 'vith the position taken by
appellant in Point I. In any event, there was no standard proved here which requires an·y inspection, especially
in vie'\? of the affirmative custon1 to rely upon man·ufacturer's rated capacity.

POINT NO. III.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE IN
PURCHASING FROM THE MANUF ACTURE.R THE
BLOCK AND CHAIN IN THIS CASE, AND T'IJE
COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THEY
COULD CONSIDER THE PERSON FROM WHOM
THE CHAIN BLOCK WAS PURCHASED AS NEGLIGENT.
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In Instruction No. 5, the Court enumerated various
elernents which the jury could take into consideration
in dete1~1nining whether defendant was negligent. Included in these elements was, in the Court's words, "The
circumstances as to \\·hom it (the chain block) ,vas
bpught from." The only implication pos~ible fron1 this
instruction was that there was evidence to support the
proposition that defendant was negligent in purchasing
the chain from an unreliable con1pany. Not only is there
no clain1 in the complaint or in any pleading in this action
that the defendant relied upon this theory of negligence,
but the record is absolutely barren of any evidence to
support such a claim if it had been made.. The jury
could not inf'er fron1 any fact presented to it or any issue
properly before it that the supplier of the chain block
to the defendant was not of the most satisfactory repu·
tation and the highest integrity. To permit the jury to
speculate that there was son1ething in "the circumstances
as to whon1 it was bought froin" _and the defendant's
conduct with reference to those circumstances that per1nit
an inference of negligence is a clear and reversible error.
The chain block concerned in this law suit was manufactured by McCollou1n Hoist & Chain Company, a
nationally advertised concern whose products are well
known in the trade. In fact the product is known in the
san1e sense in the industry that Yale & Towne, and
Reading l~ Chisholn1 are known. (R. 301, 302, 350, 351)
Plaintiff hiinself did not make any allegation in his
complaint .which placed 1n 1ssue the integrity of the
42.
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c:ou1pany fro1n "·hich defendant purchased the chain. The
allegations of negligence in plaintiff's original c~1nplaint
appear in Paragraph 6. There plaintiff alleges that the
chain ,,·as constructed by the defendant and that the lack
of proper construction by the defendant was a cause of
action con1plained of. (R.. 2) In the an1ended complaint,
plaintiff stated that the breaking of the link was the
proxin1ate result of the "negligent construction by the
defendant or by defendant's agent fron1 who1n defendant
1nay have obtained said chain block." (A1nended complaint, paragraph 6, R. 25-26) The fact of the matter
as developed at the trial is as herein stated that the
defendant obtained the chain block fro1n McColloum
IIoist &· Chain Con1pany and not any agent of its own.
rrhe only negligence could be a failure to use reasonable
care in selecting a chain block of this kind. As to this
question there is absolutely no evidence except that McCollounl Con1pany was a nationally known, reputable
con1pany.
This 1natter assmites importance in the case at bar
because of the uncontroverted and undisputed evidence
that there 'vas an affirn1ative custom in the trade to rely
upon the ~tated capacity rating of the manufacturer.
The effect of this custom is discussed elsewhere in this
brief. The Court's error 'vith reference to the point
under consideration should be considered in connection
with tlH~ innuendo~ by plaintiff's counsel to the effect
that the 1IeCulloum Company was not reliable.. (See,
for exan1ple, (R. 173.) Certainly the Court should not
._f3
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have undertaken to enlarge the is~ues 'vith reference to
kinds of negligence at issue in this action, and should
not have given an instruction 'vhich permi~ted the jury
to infer. negligence upon the theories not supported by
any proper evidence or any evidence at all.
POINT NO. IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING CHRISTENSEN TO GIVE HIS OPINION . AS TO WHETHER
THE CHAIN BLOCK SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSPECTED AFTER IT HAD BEEN IN USE FOR A
PERIOD OF FORTY-EIGHT HOURS.

The objectionable testimony by Christensen was
adduced after plaintiff's change of position as indicated
in Point No. 1 (c). Plaintiff's counsel asked:

'•Q. Now in your opinion, according to what
you would consider to be reasonable care under a
situation ",.here it is holding six tons, where men
are working in the sarne room, do you have an
opinion as to whether or not that chain block and
the links therein should have been inspected superficially? , That is, by looking at thern after this
period of forty-eight hours hanging about ",.hich
we have already mentioned 1

"A. Well"MR. BURTON: I object to that as inconlpetent, imrnaterial and irrelevant and asking for
an improper conclusion and as one, if anyone
· should rnake it, should be made by the Court and
Jury.
"THE COURT·: The objection is sustained.
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''Q. In your opinion, ~hould this have been
inspected after it had been used for a period of
forty-eight hour~, holding a "'"eight of six tons 1
"~IR.

'T

BURTON: e renew our same objection. It is the sa1ne question on which Your
Honor has just 1nade a ruling.
"THE COuRT: I think it is somewhat
different. The objection will be overruled. * * *
''Tell, all I can say on that in view of
the type of 1nachinery it "~ould certainly have been
the 1nost 'vise precaution to exan1ine it to deterInine if there 'vas any defect before the final use."
h.A..

It is subnritted that the first ruling of the Court on
tllis question "'"as proper, and that the second ruling was
clearly erroneous. The function of the jury is to estab.;.
lish a reasonable standard of care. The testimony of
Chri~tensen prior to this question was that his opinion
'vas the erack eould have developed. during the period
of use and that it 1night have been apparent if the chain
had been examined prior to the break. There is no way
to deter1nine, according to Christensen, whether the~ crack
would have been visible thirty seconds, several hours or
several days prior to the break. The follow~ng questions
and ans"~ers are indicative of his frame of mind on the
~ubject:

HQ. Now inasn1uch as you have

~o1ne

opinion
on this can you tell n1e at "-hich hour of the fortyeight this started to separate~
"A. Not being God I wouldn't know, no.
(R. 249)
lie further stated that he had never tested a chain15
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that he _was a 1netallurgist and that the testing of chains
a.s. such. was not part of his job. (R. 249) It plainly
appears, therefore, that the opinion of Mr. Christensen
as. to. whether. or not an inspection would be reasonable.
under the circurnstances here has no more validity and
is no 1nore expert than the opinion of any juror on the
subject. Ce-rtainly Christensen 'vas not qualified as an
expert to usurp the function of the jury and· make it a
deter1nination upon th~ very fact that it was· bound to
ascertain as the trier of fact.
No facts were ever presented to the jury to justify
Christensen's answering a question of this kind. Even
if. there had been facts to justify a, hypothetical question,
this one was improperly asked. If the first question had
been as to whether the witness had an opinion as to
whether such and such action was reasonable in such
and such circumstances, he could not have answered in
the negative without having to admit that such an opinio~ was based upon neither his own experience nor the
·practice of reasonable men in the industry. As the question was asked, the requisite safeguards for expert testiinony were absolutely wanting.

POINT NO. V.
THE COURT· .ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 2, 3, 4
7 AND 9 .

.The la\Y related to the duty of defendant under the
circurnstances of this case is discussed in Points T, II and
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III of this brief. No purpose 'vould be served by reiterating the requested instructions and the applicable law
at this time. The defendant's requested instructions 2,
· · · · 3, 4, 7, and 9 correctly state the applicable la'v a.nd failure
to give these instructions 'vas erroneous.

POINT NO. VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1
FOR A DIRECTED ·vERDICT AND IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S 1\IOTION TO DISMISS
~lADE TO THE COURT AT THE CONCLUSION OF
PLAINTIFF'S CASE.

As is discussed in Points I, II and III of this brief,
plaintiff did not establish a standard of care, the violation of-"\\'"hich "~as negligence. Nor did plaintiff establish
any breach of duty which defendant owed to him under
the circumstances here present. These questions are
discussed in detail heretofore in this brief and no purpose
would be served in duplicating a. discussion of Appellant's position at this point.
POINT NO. VII. ,
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS
NOS. 4 AND 5.

The error in giving In~tructions Nos. 4 and 5 is
discussed in Point I of this brief. No purpose would be
served in duplicating that discussion here.
However, even assun1ing that there was evidence
before the jury that the inspection referred to: in the
47
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instru~tions

and under Point I could have been 1uade or
sho~ld have been made, the instruction of the court is
erroneous on the further ground that it is void of any
criteria .or standards or considerations as to what factors the jury might consider in determining 'vha.t the
reasonable standard was. In other words, the jury could
not ascertain from the instructions what conduct, if it
believed the evidence 'vas true as to such conduct, it
could find to be unreasonable under the circun1stances.
It was left to speculate not only as to what evidence
would have to be believed, but '\Vhat standard could be
applied and what would constitute the deviation fron1
that standard. The primary purpose of instructions to
the jury is to furnish guide posts in established eri teria
of negligence. These guide posts are absolutely wanting
in the instructions by the court in the case at bar.
For the reasons stated in the Argurnent in Point
No. I and as herein stated, Instructions Nos. 4 and 5
are clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
This court should enter its order setting aside the
verdict and dis1nissing plaintiff's con1plaint. In any event
the errors con1mitted require granting defendant a new
trial.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY, BURTON, ~Ic~IILLAN
& RIC'HARDS,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant.
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